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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff)'Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL OLIVER,

Consolidated Case No. 20030286-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals his sentences imposed pursuant to his guilty pleas to one count of
burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202
(2003), two counts of burglary of a building, third degree felonies, in violation of section 766-202, and one count of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002). This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that no constitutional violation occurred in
sentencing where defendant's current crimes and past criminal history were disclosed in the

presentence report and formed the basis of the court's determination that concurrent terms
of imprisonment were the most appropriate sentences for the multiple felony convictions?
A trial court's determination that a sentence was legally imposed is reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995); State v. Patience, 944
P.2d 381, 384-85 (Utah App. 1997). Its underlying factual determinations are reviewed for
clear error. See State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, If 9, 31 P.3d 615, affirmed, State v.
Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937.
A trial court's determination of what sentence is appropriate is upheld unless "'no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" State v. Corbitt, 2003
UT App 417, U 6, 82 P.3d 211 (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The language of no provision is determinative of the outcome of this appeal, which
is fact-based. Any provisions cited in argument, however, are attached in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a consolidated appeal from three district court cases.1 On June 17, 2002,
defendant was charged in Second District Case No. 021701014 [hereafter #1014], with:
Count I: Burglary of a Dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2003);
Count II: Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2003);

1

Each case has a separate pleadings file, which the State designates by the last
four digits of its district court number. There is only one set of hearing transcripts.
2

Count III: Possession of a Controlled Substance (M ethamphetamine), a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002);
Count IV: Vehicle Burglary, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-204 (2003);
Count V: Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (2002); and,
Count VI: Unlawful Possession of Burglary Tools, a class B misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (2003).
(R#1014: 1-3, 35-37). Two months later, on August 27, 2002, defendant was charged in
Second District Case No. 02170147 [hereafter #1447] with:
Count I: Burglary of a Dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of
section 76-6-202;
Count II: Unlawful Acquisition, Possession, or Transfer of a Credit Card,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.3 (2003);
and,
Count III: Theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-404 (2003).
(R#1447: 1-3). On September 5, 2002, defendant was charged in Second District Case No.
021701498 [hereafter #1498], with:
Count I: Burglary of a Dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of
section 76-6-202; and,
Count II: Theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of section 76-6-404.
(R#1498: 1-2). Though the informations were filed at different times, the criminal conduct
occurred between June 6-14, 2002. See Addendum B (Informations).

3

On November 21, 2002, defendant pled guilty to four felonies pursuant to a plea
bargain. In case #1014, defendant pled guilty to second-degree burglary (Count I) and felony
possession of a controlled substance (Count II), and the remaining four charges were
dismissed (R#1014: 40-50). In case #1447, defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge of
third-degree burglary of a building (Count I reduced) and the remaining two counts were
dismissed (R#1447: 12-18). In case #1498, defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge of
third-degree burglary of a building (Count I reduced) and the theft charge was dismissed
(R#1498: 10-17). See Add B (Defendant's Statement in Advance of Pleas). •
Pursuant to the parties' agreement, defendant's drug possession plea in case #1014
was entered nunc pro tunc to the date of the offense, which protected defendant's driver's
license from further revocation (R#1014: 43; R89-Part 2: 6).2 The prosecutor also agreed
that if defendant were sentenced to and successfully completed probation, the State would
not oppose a motion to further reduce the degree of the convictions pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §76-3-402 (2003) (R#1014:43; R#1447:15;R#1498:13).3 Defendant understood that
any sentencing recommendations were not binding on the trial court and he could receive
consecutive prison terms for each felony (id.). See Add. B.

2

Record 89 contains a transcript of the morning sentencing hearing (Part I) and the
afternoon discussion between defense counsel and the judge (Part 2). The State
designates Part 1 as "R89" and Part 2 as "R89-Part 2."
3

Section 76-3-402, commonly referred to as a 402 reduction, permits a conviction
to be reduced by one degree or, if the prosecutor agrees in writing, by two degrees upon a
defendant's successful completion of probation (Add. A). The grant of any reduction is
purely discretionary with the trial court.
4

The Department of Adult Probation and Parole [AP & P] prepared a presentence
investigation report [PSI], which recommended probation, conditioned upon defendant
serving jail time of either six months straight time or twelve months with work release (R89:
12;R89-Part2: ll). 4
On January 16, 2003, the court rejected AP & P's recommendation and sentenced
defendant to the statutorily-authorized term of one-to-fifteen years imprisonment in case
#1014, and to three statutorily-authorized terms of zero-to-five years imprisonment in cases
#1014,#1447,and#1498, all sentences to run concurrently (R#1014: 53-54; R#1447:22-23;
R#1498: 20-21). Based on AP & P's assessment, the court imposed $3883.92 in restitution
plus other costs (id). See Addendum C (Sentencing Hearing).
On February 10,2003, defendant filed a motion to "correct" what he claimed were his
illegally-imposed sentences pursuant to rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (2002)
(R#1014: 55-62; R#1447: 24-31; R#1498: 22-29). On March 27, 2003, the motions were
denied (R#1014: 91-92; R#1447: 57-58; R#1498: 56-57).

4

Defendant's arguments are based on the contents of the PSI, even though he does
not attack the report's validity. Consequently, he was obligated to include the PSI in the
record on appeal, but has failed to do so. See State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58 (a copy
of the unpublished opinion is attached in Addendum F in compliance with rule 30(f), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure). The record otherwise establishes the basic parameters of
AP & P's recommendation. But other alleged facts—such as defendant's criminal history
and personal characteristics—are incapable of verification without the PSI. Because the
record on appeal is incomplete, this Court must assume the regularity of the trial
proceedings and construe any "ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom" in favor
of the lower court's rulings. See id.
5

On April 1, 2003, defendant timely appealed (R#1014: 93, 101; R#1447: 59, 66;
R#1498: 58, 66). Defendant does not attack the validity of his guilty pleas on appeal, but
only challenges the legality and reasonableness of his sentences.5
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6
Between June 6 and June 12, 2002, defendant burglarized the attached garages of
three homes and stole cash, checkbooks, credit cards, cell telephones, keys, compact audio
discs, jewelry, sunglasses, and other objects located in the garages and inside vehicles in the
garages (R#1014: 2, 41, 100; R#1447: 2-3, 13, 70; R#1498: 2, 11, 62). Following the
burglaries, some of the stolen checks were forged and some of the stolen credit cards used
to obtain goods and money at various stores (id.). Defendant's wife, Briana Salgado Oliver,
and two others, Bradon Larkin and Jereme Ogren, assisted defendant (id.). When Larkin was
arrested by the police, he confessed and named defendant (id.).

5

Below, defendant characterized his challenge as a rule 22(e) motion (R#1014: 5762; R108: 4). Rule 22(e) permits an illegal sentence to be corrected at any time and,
consequently, is a narrow jurisdictional rule applicable only to untimely claims of patent
or manifest sentencing error. State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, If 15, 84 P.3d 854.
Here, defendant's motion to correct his sentences was filed with a timely motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas, which tolled the time for appeal. See UTAH CODE ANN. 77-136 (2002) (subsequently amended) {Add. A); UTAH R. APP. P. 4(b). As a result, jurisdiction
is not at issue and defendant may attack his sentences on any grounds preserved below.
If, however, jurisdiction were at issue, defendant's allegations would not amount to
cognizable rule 22(e) error. See Thorkelson, id. at ^ | 15 & 17.
6

The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the trial court's rulings. See
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 2, 12 P.3d 92.
6

On June 14, 2002, a search warrant was executed on defendant's apartment (id.).
Numerous stolen credit cards and stolen property, valued in the thousands of dollars, were
found (id.).7 Methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were also located (id.).
Defendant was charged with eleven offenses: three second-degree felonies, three
third-degree felonies, one class-A misdemeanor, and four class-B misdemeanors. See
Statement of the Case, supra. Pursuant to a plea bargain, he pled guilty to one second degree
felony and three third degree felonies, two of which were reduced charges (id.). The
remaining seven charges were dismissed (id.). See Add. B.
Defendant admitted he was a methamphetamine addict (R89:2-3).8 Defense counsel,
who was also defendant's father, claimed his son had reformed since his arrest, but conceded
that defendant had a ten-year history of criminal offenses (R89: 11; R89-Part 2: 3-5, 16;
R108: 5-6,13-14). Beginning when he was 16 years old, defendant had juvenile court
adjudications for possession of tobacco, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug
paraphernalia, and had received counseling in connection with two incidents of shoplifting
(R89-Part 2: 3-4; R108: 5-6, 13-14). As an adult, defendant had five misdemeanor

7

The State alleged that $5,000.00 of stolen property was located; defendant
admitted "some" stolen property was found (R#1014: 2; R#1014: 41). Approixarnately,
$3884.00 in restitution was assessed (R#1014: 53-54).
8

Defendant spoke only through counsel at sentencing (R89: 8).

7

convictions: possession of drug paraphernalia, driving under the influence involving an
accident, assault, and two separate incidents of disturbing the peace (id.).9
Nevertheless, because defendant did not have any previous felony convictions and had
not been "formally" supervised by AP & P, defense counsel requested that defendant be
placed on home confinement for 30 days and then on probation (R89: 8). AP & P agreed that
probation should be considered, but only if defendant first served a term in jail of six months
straight or twelve months with work release (R89: 12). The State submitted the matter on
AP & P's recommendation, but noted that a long jail term might delay drug treatment (R89:
8-9). The maj ority of the victims requested defendant be imprisoned (R# 1014:100; R# 1447:
70; R#1498: 62).10
The trial court disagreed with defense counsel's view of his son and with the
recommendations for probation. The court explained:
Okay. I've had an opportunity to review the pre-sentence report and take into
consideration everything that's been said here today.
My observations are these, Mr. Oliver, it appears that since 1993 when
you were about 16 years old, or 16 or 17 years old, you had quite an extensive
juvenile court history and you've had quite an extensive adult history and its
doesn't seem like you're going in the right direction and it doesn't seem like
you've learned anything from earlier times when you pled guilty or were found
guilty of matters and sentenced. You have served some time but generally
you've been on probation quite a bit and it doesn't seem like anything has
worked. There [sic] are not unserious crimes. You are here on a second

9

Without the PSI, the claim that this is the entire criminal history cannot be
verified. See n. 4, supra.
10

Six victims submitted Victim Impact Statements. Three recommended prison,
two believed community service or something less than prison would be adequate
punishment, and one made no recommendation (R#1014: 100; R#1447: 70; R#1498: 62).
8

degree burglary; possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony;
a burglary, a third degree felony; another burglary. So we have three third
degree felonies and a second degree felony and whether these are involved
with drug [usage] or whatever, it's basically the past 10 years of your life have
been spent in and out of various charges and very bad behavior.
(R89: 10-11). See Add C. The court then sentenced defendant:
I'm going to depart from the recommendation, but I'm not going to depart in
the way your attorney has asked for and I'm going to send you to prison and
the reason I'm sending you to prison is to teach you that you cannot continue
in this type of behavior, this type of behavior which says I can take drugs, I can
steal, I can do this for the last - you're 26 years old and for 10 years you have
done this and the time is going to stop now or you're going to spend the rest
of your life in prison and if you want to continue to change - 1 think your
change of the last month or so has been a change to make it look good
basically for this. I don't believe, you know, I can't compare 10 years of bad
behavior with one month of good saying everything is fine. This isn't fine and
to come in here and basically ask for 30 days home confinement, you know,
under these circumstances, you know, and depart from a 6-month or a one-year
work release. I'm sentencing you to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate
term of 1 to 15 years on the Second [sic], zero to 5 on each of the thirds to run
concurrently.
(R89: 11-12). See Add C.
Later that afternoon, defense counsel, without defendant, approached the judge and
told him that he was "shocked and personally devastated" by the court's decision, but that
his son accepted it (R89-Part 2: 1, 24). Counsel recognized that the court's sentence was
lawful and stated that he was not making a motion, but said he wanted to discuss his "loss
of confidence" in the court (R89-Part 2: 2, 11). For the next hour, counsel chastised the
judge for imprisoning his son (R89-Part 2:1-30). He said the judge was "arbitrary" and the
"harshest judge in the state" and characterized the sentences as "aberrant" (R89-Part 2:8,15,
17). He believed that "there was something more in play than [counsel] was aware o f and
9

alleged that the judge had heard the "rumors" that his son had committed other felonies
because the judge signed a search warrant for defendant's car a month before the sentencing
(R89-Part 2: 8-10). The judge explained that he did not remember signing a new warrant,
but possibly did because he signs all the search warrants for the Layton City Police (R89-Part
2: 8-9). Counsel next alleged that the judge harbored some hidden reason for rejecting AP
& P's recommendation (R89-Part 2:13). These allegations and criticisms continued for over
40 minutes until the judge interjected:
I can tell you one other thing Mr. Oliver, when you talked about AP & P, AP
& P because of the budget of the state [sic] of Utah never, hardly ever
recommends prison. Very seldom do they recommend prison and the reason
for that is because they're under budget constraints. But I can tell you that we
have a jail that is full and every time I put a person a year in jail, I get a call the
next day from the jail to let three out and so what I've been doing and what I
understand other judges are doing is the people who have a year commitment
are usually going to prison now because we have too heavy of a load in the
Davis County Jail.
(R89-Part2:15,21). See Addendum D (Afternoon Session). Defense counsel responded that
sending people to prison because of jail overcrowding was wrong (id.). The court opined
that overcrowding was part of the "system," but stated that a sentencing judge does not "just
point, you know, a thing at the wall and throw a dart and say, hum, prison; probation; jail"
(R89-Part 2: 22). Instead, as in this case, the judge receives the presentence report and
I read those and I make the best determination and that's what I did and I guess
what bothers me just a little bit is the fact that you are both the attorney and as
the father are coming into here and telling me that you have no confidence in
the Court and all this other stuff that I don't believe you would do if you had
somebody else that was the defendant in this case.
(id). The court continued:
10

I believe that Mr. Oliver, the defendant, should go to prison based upon his
history and what's in the pre-sentence report and upon the discretion that I
exercised. You do not and you believe that's improper. That is a difference
of opinion and I don't do it for anything because of my feelings toward you,
my feelings toward your son or anybody else. It's the basis of my opinion,
what was in the report and the exercise of my discretion and as I did with the
other five or six people that I sent to prison today, I don't do that lightly. I
don't do it lightly [sic] people going to jail or prison.
(R89-Part 2: 23). See Add. D. Defense counsel continued to allege that the judge sentenced
defendant to prison because the jail was overcrowded, the judge again clarified:
No, that's not the only reason I recommend that.... I just told you the fact is
that AP & P doesn't recommend prison because of their budget constraints and
they've been told by the higher ups about that and so I am saying that when I
get a recommendation and they're saying one year jail, which in reality should
be prison, I am sending people to prison.
(R89-Part 2: 27) (emphasis added). See Add. D. Finally, after more than an hour of
counsel's complaints, the judge terminated the encounter (R89-Part 2: 30).
Defendant subsequently filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R#1014:
55-56; R#1477:24-25; R#1498: 22-23). Defense counsel claimed that the plea bargain was
based on defendant receiving probation and eventually being eligible for a 402 reduction, but
admitted that defendant knew the court was not bound by the parties' recommendations
(R108: 1-3). The court summarily denied the motion (R108: 3-4). Defendant does not
challenge that ruling on appeal.
Defendant also filed a "petition for post-conviction relief which sought correction
of his "illegally imposed" sentences pursuant to rule 22(e) (R#1014: 57-62; R#1477: 26-31;
R# 1498:24-29). Defendant alleged that the court had only sentenced him to prison because

11

the jail was overcrowded and had failed to reveal this fact until after sentencing (R108: 410). Defendant claimed that without "extreme aggravating circumstances," his imprisonment
was cruel and unusual because he had not been given "one chance, not even one chance to
sit back and say, 'Okay, you're on probation, let's watch you, let's see how you're going to
conduct your life'" (R108: 18-22).
The court rejected defendant's arguments and concluded that no illegality occurred
in sentencing (R108: 23). See Addendum E (Post-Judgment Ruling). The court found that
the "record is absolutely clear" that during the afternoon encounter, the court only brought
up prison and jail overcrowding in response to an "hour of basically, I don't knowr what you
could call what you did," other than getting "something off your chest" (R108: 10-11). The
court noted that only after counsel persisted in "asking things" about why the
recommendation was not followed, the court offered its view that AP & P often did not
recommend prison, even when warranted, because of overcrowding (Rl 08: 10-13, 20). At
the same time, the trial judge was equally aware of problems caused by long-term
confinements in jail (id.). Overcrowding was not, however, the basis of the court's
sentencing determination; instead, the court
took into consideration the fact that [defendant] had a juvenile record, that he
had had five misdemeanors as an adult from 1995 to 1999; that he's been
charged in a spree of felonies between June 6th and June 12th in these three
cases; that he ultimately pled to four felonies that included burglaries and
restitution. Taking all those things into consideration, I sentenced him to
prison. I believe that is within due process. I believe that is not illegal and if
it is illegal, then you have your appeal and the Appellate Court can make that
decision.

12

(R108:23 & 13). See Add. E.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant, a drug addict, committed multiple felonies and misdemeanors in the course
of burglarizing three homes. The crimes followed a ten-year history of criminal involvement.
The court rejected recommendations for probation and imposed concurrent terms of
imprisonment based on the crimes involved and defendant's history. The sentencing
determination fully comported with constitutional requirements and reasonably reflected the
legitimate personal judgment of the trial court. Consequently, defendant's challenges to his
sentences fail.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT RELIED ON INFORMATION CONTAINED IN
THE PRESENTENCE REPORT IN REASONABLY EXERCISING ITS
DISCRETION TO IMPOSE STATUTORILY-AUTHORIZED
CONCURRENT TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT, DESPITE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROBATION
Defendant claims that his sentences are illegal because the court allegedly did not
timely disclose the facts underlying its sentencing decision and because the sentences were
"fixed and mechanical" and imposed without regard to defendant's individual circumstances
(Br.Aplt. at 9-13). Defendant's argument lack merit.11
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In defendant's brief, he states two issues, but presents a joint argument {Br.Aplt
at 2 & 9-14). The State responds to the joint argument. Additionally, while defendant
nominally cites to the state constitution, no separate state analysis is presented. See State
v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ^ 2, 84 P.3d 841 (refusing to interpret state constitutional
provision differently than its federal counterpart when appellant failed to make a separate
state constitutional argument).
13

(A) This Court Should Not Reach the Merits Because Defendant Failed to
Include the PSI and Failed to Marshal the Evidence in Support of the
Court's Rulings.
As noted, supra at n.49 even if defendant is not attacking the validity of the PSI, he
is obligated to include the report where his arguments are necessarily connected with the
report's contents. See State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58 {Add. F). His failure to do so
permits this Court to presume the regularity of the proceedings below and construe all
ambiguities and record deficiencies in favor of the lower court's rulings. See id.
Additionally, because defendant's arguments—that the trial court relied on an
undisclosed factor in sentencing and defendant's incarceration is cruel and unusual—are
necessarily fact-specific, defendant is obligated to marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's rulings, before he may challenge the merits of those rulings. See West Valley
City v. Hoskins, 2002 UT App 223, Tf 13, 51 P.3d 52 (citing West Valley City v. Majestic
Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)). Defendant has failed to do so here.
Consequently, this Court may summarily affirm. See id.
For example, in challenging his sentences, defendant fails to acknowledge that even
though AP & P recommended probation with jail time, the agency also found that defendant
had mental health problems in addition to drug addiction, that he was likely still using drugs
because he was not in drug therapy, and that he presented "a serious threat of violent
behavior" (R89: 2-4).12 These facts support the trial court's rejection of probation.

12

Below, defendant disputed some of AP & P's findings, but did not establish their
inaccuracy (R89: 1-5).
14

Similarly, though defendant attaches the transcript of his counsel's afternoon
encounter with the judge to his addenda, he fails to fully acknowledge the judge's statements
during that encounter and ignores the judge's clarifications of what he meant. Compare
State's Statement of the Facts, supra, with Br.Aplt at 7. Moreover, defendant ignores the
court's findings and ruling in denying his post-judgment motion, other than to acknowledge
such a hearing took place. Compare State's Statement of Facts, supra, with Br.Aplt at 5 &
8. See also Add. E. Defendant's omissions are egregious given his rejection of this Court's
invitation to provide supplemental briefing. See Utah Court of Appeals' Order, No.
20030286-CA, dated 10/30/03.
On these grounds alone, defendant's arguments may be summarily rejected. If,
however, the merits are considered, the arguments nevertheless fail.
(B) All Relevant Facts Were Disclosed to Defendant
"The fair administration of justice at the least requires that the information upon
which the judge relies in imposing punishment is accurate." See State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d
1241, 1249 (Utah 1980). Consequently, the facts relied in sentencing must be disclosed to
a defendant to permit him an opportunity to point out any inaccuracies. Id. at 1244. Usually,
this is accomplished through disclosure of the presentence report. Id. at 1248-49.
Here, defendant does not claim that the PSI was not disclosed to him or that its
contents were not accurate and reliable. Instead, defendant asserts that he was denied due
process because the court failed to reveal "the determinative factor" for sentencing defendant
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to prison, to wit, overcrowding in the Davis County Jail (Br.Aplt. at 7, 11-13). Defendant's
argument lacks factual support.
While due process requires the disclosure of determinative facts underlying a court's
sentencing determination, it does not require disclosure of the court's mental process or its
reasons for crediting one fact or another. Cf. Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1246-49. Nor, as claimed
by defendant, does due process require a court to justify its rejection of a presentence
recommendation or specifically address aggravating and mitigating factors justifying one
sentencing option over another. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-406 (2003); UTAH R. CRIM.
P. 22 (general sentencing procedures); but see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (2003)
(requiring findings for imposition of a minimum mandatory term) {Add. A).
Here, in response to counsel's hour-long afternoon criticism of the sentences, the
judge expressed his belief that AP & P "very seldom" recommended prison, even when
warranted, because the prison was overcrowded (R89-Part 2:21, 27). The judge stated that
the Davis County Jail was also overcrowded and that when a defendant is sent to jail on a
long-term commitment, the jail often calls the court and complains that it must release other
inmates to accommodate the long-term inmate (R89-Part 2: 21). As the judge explained,
these housing concerns did not drive his sentencing decision, but explained why the judge
did not fully credit AP & P's recommendation (R89-Part 2: 22-23, 27). Additionally, the
court was simply discussing the realities faced by any judge in imposing long-term jail
commitments (R89-Part 2: 21-23). But as the judge repeatedly stated, it was the facts
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contained in the presentence report which compelled him to sentence defendant to prison
(R89-Part2: 10-12,22-23).
At sentencing, during the subsequent afternoon session, and in denying defendant's
post-judgment motion, the court consistently stated the facts it relied upon in sentencing
defendant. These included:
(1) defendant had committed serious multiple felony and misdemeanor
offenses in a one week period;
(2) three of crimes involved burglary, a crime of violence;
(3) the crimes resulted in substantial economic loss to the victims;
(4) defendant had committed crimes for ten years, from the age of 16 until his
present age of 26;
(5) defendant had at least three juvenile adjudications; and
(6) defendant had at least five adult convictions.
(R89: 10-12;R89-Part2: 10-12,22-23; R108:13,23). Additionally, the court believed that
defendant's recent claims of reform were opportunistic for sentencing, but that even if the
reform were genuine, it did not outweigh defendant's criminal history or the seriousness of
his current crimes (R89: 11).13
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During the afternoon session, defense counsel said he was "most upset" by these
comments and that his son had reformed for six months, and not just the one month
claimed by the court (R89-Part 2: 7-8). AP & P, however, noted that because defendant
was not involved in drug treatment, he was probably still using drugs (R89: 2).
Moreover, even by counsel's admission, defendant drove his wife to urine-analysis every
week, yet did not participate in such a program himself or any other supervisory
programs, except for a self-help group which he "generally" attended (R89: 2-3).
Consequently, defendant's claim of reform was largely self-reported (id.).
17

In sum, as the trial court correctly found and concluded all relevant information was
disclosed and no due process violation occurred (R108: 23). Moreover, even if the prisonjail overcrowding aspects should have been disclosed at sentencing, any error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 402-03 (1999)
(holding that harmless error analysis may be applied even in death penalty cases where the
jury considers an improper factor). Defendant learned of the court's views in the afternoon
session and, subsequently, had the opportunity to attack the relevancy and accuracies of those
views in the post-judgment motion hearing (R89-2: 21-27; R108: 8-10). Nevertheless, the
court stated that, in its opinion, the sentences were appropriate based on defendant's past
criminal history and current criminal involvement (R89-2:22-23;R108:23). See discussion,
infra. Consequently, whether the information was disclosed or not, the sentences would be
the same. See Jones, id.
(C) Rejection of AP & P's Recommendation Was a Permissible Exercise
of the Trial Court's Discretion.
Defendant's secondary argument—that his incarceration constitutes cruel and usual
punishment—though clothed in a constitutional mantel, amounts to no more than a claim that
the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting AP & P's recommendation. See Br.Aplt. at
2 & 10. As defense counsel admitted below, a claim that a court abused its discretion by
imposing a lawful sentence is a "waste of words" (R89-Part 2: 11). Given the wide variety
of sentencing alternatives, "very wide discretion" is not only permitted the trial court, but
"absolutely require[d]" in sentencing. Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1244. The exercise of discretion
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in sentencing "necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court." State v. Corbitt, 2003
UT App 417, f 6, 82 P.3d 211. Abuse of that "vested" discretion occurs only if "'it can be
said that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court.'" Id. (quoting State
v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d885, 887 (Utah 1978)). AccordStatev. Kfl/rfuviHOT, 2003 UT App 432,
f 14,82 P.2d 1167.
Defendant implies that the needs of the criminal are paramount in sentencing (Br.Aplt.
at 10 & 13), This is not incorrect. The sentencing court should consider "rehabilitation,
deterrence, punishment, restitution, and incapacitation." State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App
214, \ 5, 73 P.3d 991. "'Many different ingredients factor into the sentencing process, and
the discretionary imposition of probation rests in many cases upon subtleties not apparent on
the face of a cold record.'" Id. at 1 9 (quoting State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah
App. 1991), and upholding determination that prison, not probation, was the appropriate
sentence). Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertion (Br.Aplt. At 5 & 75), a "comparative
review of other criminals and their crimes" is not required. Id. at \ 6 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Nor, as claimed by defendant {Br.Aplt. At 10-11), is the court's
discretion
to be surrendered to a mathematical formula by which numbers of
circumstances rather than weight of circumstances are determinative. The
overriding consideration is that the sentence be just. One factor in mitigation
or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale.
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State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990). In sum, a sentence will not be overturned
simply because a defendant views "his situation differently than did the trial court." State
v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 14, 40 P.3d 626.
Defendant claimed below that prison was inappropriate because he had not previously
been convicted of a felony or formally supervised (R108: 4-10, 21-22). Defendant's
assertion that he deserved "one chance" rang hollow with the trial court in light of
defendant's 10-year criminal history and the seriousness of his current conduct. As the court
recognized, the problem was not that defendant had not been given a chance, but that he had
not learned from the chances he had been given (R89: 10-12). See Add. C.
In sum, while AP & P and the court differed in their opinions of where and for how
long defendant should be incarcerated, they agreed that defendant's conduct warranted some
period of substantial incarceration. See Statement ofFacts, supra. Defendant disagreed and
urged no incarceration, but only 30 days of home confinement.

See id.

The court

considered defendant's current conduct (eleven felony and misdemeanor offenses reduced
to four felonies through plea bargain), the nature of his most serious charges (burglary); the
scope of the damage to the victims (almost $4000.00 in restitution), his past criminal
convictions (three formal juvenile adjudications and five adult misdemeanor convictions),
defendant's professed recent reform (which the court believed was opportunistic), and other
information in the presentence report (including, even on this limited record, AP & P' s belief
that defendant had mental health problems and a potential for violence). Based on these
legitimate factors, the court determined that prison was the most appropriate sentence. While
20

others differed in their assessment of these facts, that difference does not render the court's
ultimate determination fundamentally unfair or unduly harsh. See cases, supra.
Finally, even if this Court were to find prejudicial defect in defendant's sentences, his
request for relief—to "remand the matter with instructions to follow the recommendation of
AP & P—is impermissible. See Br.Aplt. at 14. An appellate court has no right to compel
imposition of a particular sentence, but only the authority to vacate an invalid one.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's sentences should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $Jh

day of March, 2004.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
1896

Sec, 9.

[Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 30. Decision of the court: dismissal; notice of decision.
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or
otherwise dispose of any order or judgment appealed from. If the findings of
fact in a case are incomplete, the court may order the trial court or agency to
supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the
issues presented and the facts as found from the evidence and may direct the
trial court or agency to enter judgment in accordance with the findings as
revised. The court may also order a new trial or further proceedings to be
conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass upon and determine all
questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary
to the final determination of the case.
(b) Decision in criminal cases. If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new
trial shall be held unless otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of
conviction or other order is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order
affirmed or modified shall be executed.
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; entry of decision. When a judgment,
decree, or order is reversed, modified, or the reasons shall be stated concisely
in writing and filed with the clerk. Any justice or judge concurring or
dissenting may likewise give reasons in writing and file the same with the
clerk. The entry by the clerk in the records of the court shall constitute the
entry of the judgment of the court.
(d) Decision without opinion. If, after oral argument, the court concludes
that a case satisfies the criteria set forth in Rule 31(b), it may dispose of the
case by order without written opinion. The decision shall have only such effect
as precedent as is provided for by Rule 31(f).
(e) Notice of decision. Immediately upon the entry of the decision, the clerk
shall give notice to the respective parties and make the decision public in
accordance with the direction of the court.
(f) Citation of decisions. Published decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals may be cited as precedent in all courts of the State.
Unpublished decisions may also be cited, so long as all parties and the court
are supplied with accurate copies at the time all such decisions are first cited.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2003.)

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no
contest, the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which
shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the
verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the
defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may
commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any
information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal
cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting
attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in
defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in
defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the
court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of
conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if-any,
and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court
shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and
the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court
shall issue its commitment setting forth the sentence. The
officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall
deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and
shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it
with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the
court shall impose sentence in accordance with Title 77,
Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over
a mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order.

76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Hearing.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity
for extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77,
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imnrisonment:
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(h) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of
a plea agreement.
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall
follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a,
Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.

(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defen3ant is transported*
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles / defendant is transportedand
'
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
« (ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip,
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned,
the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that
the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental
entity for the extradition.
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for
the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after
sentencing if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in
incarceration in the county correctional facility; and
(ii) (A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county
correctional facility through a contract with the Department of
Corrections; or
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement
provided under Section 64-13c-301 if the defendant is a state
prisoner housed in a county correctional facility as a condition of
probation under Subsection 77-18-1(8).
(b) (i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are:
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and
transportation costs established under Section 64-13c-302; and
(B) the costs of transportation services and medical care that
exceed the negotiated reimbursement rate established under
Subsection 64-13c-302(2).
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include
expenses incurred by the county correctional facility in providing
reasonable accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual
with a disability as defined and covered by the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including
medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the
court-ordered restitution under this Subsection (6), the court shall consider the criteria provided under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through
(iv).
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity
under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section
76-1-304, the county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the
defendant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a).
(7) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.

(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.
(8) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This Subsection (8) takes precedence
over any conflicting provision of law.

76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the
order of judgment and commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to
each other; and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative
needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole,
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing
would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request,
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as
provided under Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are
imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or.
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect'
of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the
Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly
imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum
terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of

76-3-402. Conviction of l o w e r d e g r e e of offense.
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty
and to the history and character of the defendant, concludes it
would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for
that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence
the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to t h a t
offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically provided
by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree
of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction
is considered to be for a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A
misdemeanor and the sentence imposed is within the
limits provided by law for a class A misdemeanor; or
Ob) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the
defendant is placed on probation, whether committed
to jail as a condition of probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his probation; and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, and a hearing if requested by either
party or the court, finds it is in the interest of justice
that the conviction be considered to be for a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this
section unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or
on the court record that the offense may be reduced two
degrees. In no case may ah offense be reduced under this
section by more than two degrees.
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any
person from obtaining or being granted an expungement of his
record as provided by law.
1991

77-13-6, Withdrawal of plea,
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior
to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only
upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not
knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest,
except for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by
motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not
be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held
in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made
within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the
time period specified in Subsection (2)(c) shall be pursued
under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies
Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
P.O. Box 618
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: (801)451-4300
Fax:
(801)451-4328
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
AMENDED
INFORMATION

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL WILLIAM OLIVER
DOB: 12/25/1976,
Defendant.

Case No. 021701014

The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant,
either directly or as a party, at County of Davis, State of Utah, committed the crimes of:
COUNT 1
BURGLARY, 76-6-202 UCA, second degree felony, as follows: That on or
about June 6, 2002, at the place aforesaid the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a
dwelling or any portion of a dwelling with intent to commit: theft.
COUNT 2
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, 76-6-408 UCA, third degree
felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant received, retained or
disposed of property of another, knowing that the property had been stolen or believing that it
probably had been stolen, or concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing, selling or
withholding the property, knowing the property had been stolen, intending to deprive the owner
thereof, and the value of said property was or exceeded $1,000, but was less than $5,000.
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COUNT 3
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
UCA, third degree felony, as follows: That on or about June 14, 2002, at the place aforesaid the
defendant did knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled substance; to wit
methamphetamine.
COUNT 4
VEHICLE BURGLARY, 76-6-204 UCA, class A misdemeanor, as follows: That
on or about June 6, 2002, at the place aforesaid the defendant unlawfully entered any vehicle
with intent to commit a felony or theft.
COUNT 5
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, 58-37a-5(l) UCA, class B
misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about June 14, 2002, at the place aforesaid the defendant
did knowingly, intentionally or recklessly use, or possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia
to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise
introduce a controlled substance into the human body.
COUNT 6
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS, 76-6-205 UCA, class B
misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about June 14, 2002, at the place aforesaid the defendant
did have in his possession an instrument, tool, device, article, or other thing adapted, designed, or
commonly used in advancing or facilitating the commission of any offense, under circumstances
manifesting an intent to use or knowledge that some person intends to use the same in the
commission of a burglary or theft.

This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Tadd Lowe.
Authorized September 11, 2002,
for presentment and filing:
MELVIN C.WILSON
Davis County Attorney

Deputy Davis County Attorney
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MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
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800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: (801)451-4300
Fax:
(801)451-4328
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL WILLIAM OLIVER
DOB: 12/25/1976
Defendant.

Bail
INFORMATION
Case No.
OTNNo

:

tk

The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant
either directly or as a party, during June 10 through June 11, 2002, at County of Davis, State of
Utah, committed the crimes of:
COUNT 1
BURGLARY, 76-6-202 UCA, a second degree felony, as follows: That at the
time and place aforesaid the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling or any
portion of a dwelling with intent to commit theft.
COUNT 2
UNLAWFUL ACQUISITION, POSSESSION OR TRANSFER OF CARD, 76-6506.3 UCA, a third degree felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant
acquired a financial transaction card from another without the consent of the card holder or the
issuer, or, with the knowledge that it has been acquired without consent, and with intent to use it
in violation of Utah Code §76-6-506.2.

COUNT 3
THEFT, 76-6-404 UCA, a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and
place aforesaid the defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of
another with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of said property was
less than $300.
This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Shawn Lewis.
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy
Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Shawn
Lewis of the Layton Police Department, and the Information herein is based upon such personal
observations and investigation of said officer.
1. Between the night of June 10, 2002 and the morning of June 11, 2002, an
unknown person entered the garage of Bonnie and Layne Sackett, which is attached to their
residence, and took a wallet and day planner that belonged to Mr. Sackett from a vehicle in the
garage. Mr. Sackett's credit cards were in the wallet.
2. At approximately 9:00 A.M. on June 11, 2002, Mr. Sackett's credit card was
used at the Layton K-Mart to purchase merchandise worth $154.51.
3. At approximately 10:14 A.M. on June 11, 2002, the defendant, Michael
William Oliver, attempted to purchase merchandise with a value of $284.30 from the Target
store in Layton. The store's security video shows the defendant standing at the cash register with
Briana Salgado. It also shows the defendant handing a credit card to the store cashier. Officer
Shane Whitaker of the Farmington Police Department has viewed the store's security video, and
identified the defendant and Briana Salgado.
4. On June 14, 2002, a search warrant was executed on the defendant's
apartment. During the search officers found Layne Sackett's wallet.

Authorized August 20, 2002
for presentment and filing:
MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis Cerunty Attorney

Deputy Davis County Attor
At the time of filing, issuance of a Summons rather than a Warrant of Arrest is requested.

MELVTN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
P.O. Box 618
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: (801)451-4300
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
Bail
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
INFORMATION
vs.
s
MICHAEL WILLIAM OLIVER
Case No.
DOB: 12/25/1976
OTNNo.
Defendant.
idant
The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant

03LI70/W& F

either directly or as a party, on or about June 08,2002, at County of Davis, State of Utah,
committed the crimes of:
COUNT 1
BURGLARY, 76-6-202 UCA, a second degree felony, as follows: That at the
time and place aforesaid the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling or any
portion of a dwelling with intent to commit theft.
COUNT 2
THEFT, 76-6-404 UCA, a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and
place aforesaid the defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of
another with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of said property was
less than $300.
This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Eric Johnson.
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy
Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Eric Johnson
of the Farmington Police Department, and the Information herein is based upon such personal
observations and investigation of said officer.

1. Between the evening of June 8, 2002 and the morning of June 9, 2002 in
Davis County, Utah someone entered the garage that is attached to the home of Paulette Brimley.
They stole Ms. Brimleys wallet out of one of the vehicles she had parked in the garage. Ms.
Brimley told Farmington Detective Shane Whitaker that her credit card had been used at several
locations on Sunday, June 9, 2002. One of the locations Ms. Brimley's card was used at was the
Target store in Layton. Detective Whitaker eventually found out that one of the individuals who
had used the card at Target was Jereme Ogren. When Jereme was interviewed about Ms.
Brimleys credit card, he admitted that he had used it at several different locations, but that he
had obtained the card from the defendant, Michael William Oliver.
2. Detective Whitaker eventually learned that an individual named Braden
Larkin had admitted to being involved with the burglary of Ms. Brimleys garage. Detective
Whitaker interviewed Braden, and Braden told him that he had taken the defendant to Ms.
Brimleys residence, and the defendant entered the garage, taking a wallet and cash from a
vehicle.
3. On June 14, 2002, a search warrant was executed on the defendant's home.
Among other items found were a Pier One Import card and a Chevron gas card belonging to
Paulette Brimley.
Authorized August 21, 2002
for presentment and filing:

^~\

MELVINC. WILSON
Davis County Attorney,.

\ 1
/\

Deputy Davis County Attorney
At the time of filing, issuance of a Summons rather than a Warrant of Arrest is requested*

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF U
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 021701014
021701447
021701498

MICHAEL WILLIAM OLIVER
Defendant.

I, MICHAEL WILLIAM OLIVER, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of
and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty to the following crime(s):

Crime & Statutory

Degree

Punishment

Provision

Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

A

Burglary of Dwelling

Felony 2

1-15 years

Possession Controlled Substance

Felony 3

0-5 years

Felony 3

0-5 years

Felony 3

0-5 years

(District Court Case 021701014)
B

Burglary of Building

1

(District Court Case 021701447)

C

Burglary of Building
(District Court Case 021701498)

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Informations against me. I have read them, or had
them read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty.
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty are:
*
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I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) listed above.
I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty plea and prove
the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty:
1. In Case 021701014. Dennis Gray reported that sometime during the early morning hours of
June 6, 2002, his garage, which is attached to his home, was entered and several credit cards, checks, and
other items were stolen out of this vehicle. Bradon Larkin was interviewed and stated that he was with
defendant when they entered the Mr. Gray's home and stole checks, credit cards and other itemsfromhis
vehicle.
2. On June 14, 2002. a search warrant was executed on the home of defendant as a result of that
5oM€

'

search, caac^—$5,000.00 ill stolen property was found, along with methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia.
3. In Case 021701447. between the night of June 10, 2002 and the morning of June 11, 2002, an
unknown person entered the garage of Bonnie and Layne Sackett, which is attached to their residence,
and took a wallet and day planner that belonged to Mr. Sackettfroma vehicle in the garage. Mr. Sackett's
credit cards were in the wallet.
4. At approximately 9:00 A.M. on June 11, 2002, Mr. Sackett's credit card was used at the
Layton K-Mart to purchase merchandise worth $154.51.
5. At approximately 10:14 A.M. on June 11, 2002, the defendant, Michael William Oliver,
attempted to purchase merchandise with a value of $284.30 from the Target store in Layton. The store's
security video shows the defendant standing at the cash register with Briana Salgado. It also shows the
defendant handing a credit card to the store cashier. Officer Shane Whitaker of the Farmington Police
Department has viewed the store's security video, and identified the defendant and Briana Salgado.
6. On June 14, 2002, a search warrant was executed on the defendant's apartment. During the
search officers found Layne Sackett's wallet.
7. In Case 021701498, between the evening of June 8, 2002 and the morning of June 9, 2002 in
Davis County, Utah someone entered the garage that is attached to the home of Paulette Brimley. They
stole Ms. Brimley's wallet out of one of the vehicles she had parked in the garage. Ms. Brimley told
Farmington Detective Shane Whitaker that her credit card had been used at several locations on Sunday,
June 9, 2002. One of the locations Ms. Brimley's card was used at was the Target store in Layton.
Detective Whitaker eventually found out that one of the individuals who had used the card at Target was
Jereme Ogren. When Jereme was interviewed about Ms. Brimley's credit card, he admitted that he had
used it at several different locations, but that he had obtained the card from the defendant, Michael
William Oliver.
8. Detective Whitaker eventually learned that an individual named Braden Larkin had admitted
2

to being involved with the burglary of Ms. Brimley's garage. Detective Whitaker interviewed Braden,
and Braden told him that he had taken the defendant to Ms. Brimley's residence, and the defendant
entered the garage, taking a wallet and cashfroma vehicle.
9. On June 14, 2002, a search warrant was executed on the defendant's home. Among other
items found were a Pier One Import card and a Chevron gas card belonging to Paulette Brimley.
Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering this plea voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the
constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up all the
following rights:
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford
one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might later, if the
judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me.
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty. I also
understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of nw guilty plea.
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is A?)A?U C<£
My attorney and I have folly discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my
guilty plea.
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury
and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty.
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial,
(a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and (b) my attorney,
or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the
witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I
chose to and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a jury
trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to testify, no one
could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know that if I chose not to testify,
the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I am
presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the
charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State
would have the burden of proving each element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
3

I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be admitting
that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I would
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an appeal, the State
would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I
plead guilty.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the statutory and
constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime to which
I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be
subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a
prison term, fine, or both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed.
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crime(s), including
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime involved,
the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the same time
(concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead to. I also
know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been
convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on
parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states
on the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.
Plea bargain. My guilty plea is not the result of a plea bargain between myself and the
prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully
contained in this statement, including those explained below:
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Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of M &<}*#*?**
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any
opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.

4

Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful influence
of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this
statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
I am satisjSed with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am

years of age. I have attended school through the /* /-—grade.

I can read and

understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to me.
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment
when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or
intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding
these proceedings and the consequences of my plea.

I am free of any mental disease, defect, or

impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily entering my plea.
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I must file a written motion to
withdraw my plea within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final judgment has been
entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause. I will not be allowed
to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any reason.
Dated this

t1

day of

A/fl/vcm 4 * /

, 2002.
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DEFENDANT

Certificate of Defense Attorhey
I certify that I am the attorney for MICHAEL WILLIAM OLIVER, the defendant above, and that I
know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and
believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically
competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of
the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these,
along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

5

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against MICHAEL WILLIAM
OLIVER, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations
are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record
before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of
defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea is entered and that the^ceptance of the plea would serve
the public interest.
/ J J^

PROSECUTION ATTORNEY
Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant and
counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds that
the defendant's guilty plea is freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea to the crime(s) set forth in the
Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this 3/34-Jy day of 0 Omr^l><A_
, 2003,

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Addendum C

1

so based upon the simple fact that he did not have a prior

2

felony for drugs, is the reason why he was not accepted into

3

drug court.

4

they would have accepted him except for that and we discussed

5

that directly with Judge Memmott.

6

that we were taking initially and had he had a prior felony

7

conviction that would count for drug court, he would have been

8

in drug court and this would have been handled substantially

9

different.

Otherwise, he was a candidate for that program and

And so that was a direction

It was just for the fact that he did not have that

10 l prior felony is what puts us before this Court today,
11

recognizing Mr. Oliver's conduct, and I don't mean to minimize

12

that.

13

another alternative that we were looking at, agreed to by the

I just wanted the Court to understand that there was

14 I County and myself and just did not work out because he record
15

was not bad enough.

16
17

THE COURT:
drug charges.

18 J

MR. OLIVER:

19

talking about.

20

Honor.

21

for the drug court.

22

Well, his record wasn't bad enough for

For the drug court.

That's what I'm

I'm not talking about anything else, Your

We're not trying to minimize anything, I'm just saying

THE COURT:

Okay.

I've had an opportunity to review

23

the pre-sentence report and take into consideration everything

24

that's been said here today.

25 I

My observations are these, Mr. Oliver, it appears
10

Ml

1

that since 1993 when you were about 16 years old, or 16 or 17

2

years old, you had quite an extensive juvenile court history

3

and you've had quite an extensive adult history and it doesn't

4

seem like you're going in the right direction and it doesn't

5

seem like you've learned anything from earlier times when you

6

pled guilty or were found guilty of matters and sentenced.

7

have served some time but generally you've been on probation

8

quite a bit and it doesn't seem like anything has worked.

9

There are not unserious crimes.

You

You are here on a second

10

degree burglary; possession of a controlled substance, a third

11

degree felony; a burglary, a third degree felony; another

12

burglary.

13

degree felony and whether these are involved with drug or

14

whatever, it's basically the past 10 years of your life have

So we have three third degree felonies and a second

15 I been spent in and out of various charges and very bad behavior.
16

I'm going to depart from the recommendation, but I'm

17

not going to depart in the way your attorney has asked for and

18

I'm going to send you to prison and the reason I'm sending you

19

to prison is to teach you that you cannot continue in this type

20

of behavior, this type of behavior that basically says I can

21

take drugs, I can steal, I can do this for the last - you're 26

22

years old and for 10 years you have done this and the time is

23

going to stop now or you're going to spend the rest of your

24 I life in prison and if you want to continue to change - I think
25 | your change of the last month or so has been a change to make
11

1

it look good basically for this.

I don't believe, you know, I

2

can't compare 10 years of bad behavior with one month of good

3

saying everything is fine.

4

and basically ask for 30 days home confinement, you know, under

5

these circumstances, you know, and depart from a 6-month or a

6

one-year work release.

7

Prison for an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years on the

8

Second, zero to 5 on each of the thirds to run concurrently.

This isn't fine and to come in here

I'm sentencing you to the Utah State

9 1 I'm ordering that restitution be paid in the amount of
10

$3,883.92. That can be subject to your request to have a

11

hearing on the restitution, DNA testing, and payment of the $75

12

fee.

13

also have 30 days to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea

14

and you're going to be committed forthwith,

You will have 30 days to appeal this sentence.

15 I

MR. OLIVER:

16

THE COURT: Yes,

17

(Whereupon a sidebar discussion was held)

18 J

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

You'll

Your Honor, may be approach briefly?

19
20
21
22
23
24
25 I
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Addendum D

1

police report.

I've read it. And the police report said, he's

2

been involved in numerous burglaries.

3

the streets looking for additional burglaries, in the police

4

report.

5

was not charged with any burglaries.

6

anything of that nature from that offense or from that

7

situation and yet this comment of a month ago is very curious

8

to me because that's when this warrant was signed and you can

9

say, "Well, I didn't know anything about it." There was

They drove up and down

He had not been involved in anything and he's not - he
He was not charged with

10

nothing said that would lead this Court to believe that one

11

month —

12

THE COURT:

Hold on just a minute.

The month issue,

13

you brought up the month that you said that he has been living

14

with you for the past month.

15

brought up.

16

MR. OLIVER:

That's the only month that I

Excuse me, didn't say any such thing

17

Your Honor.

18

said he's been with me since July 3rd which was 22 days after

19

he was incarcerated.

20

I've never said a month, never.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. OLIVER:

23

THE COURT:

24

I said he's been with me, and I started off and I

Go back and listen to the record because

Okay.
Never.

It didn't come from me.

Well, okay, well, first of all, if you

have your speech that you want to give about how you've lost

25 I confidence in me as a judge because you feel like I am the
10

1

hardest judge that ever existed in the state of Utah, you are

2

entitled to that opinion but I got a pre-sentence report that

3

said that the recommendation was one year in jail and one year

4

in jail, and I can tell you, there were about six people that

5

went to prison today.

6

wasn't the only one that had one month or one year that was in

7

the Davis County Jail that was suggested to go to prison and

8

all I can say is on the basis of the background that I saw in

9

that pre-sentence report, his age, and the fact that we had the

Your son wasn't the only one.

Your son

10

number of felonies that we had, a second degree felony, three

11

third degree felonies and basically the past background and

12

history, that is what I based my opinion on.

13

that is abuse of discretion, you can appeal the sentence.

14
15

MR. OLIVER:

You and I both know that that's a waste

of words to me, to everybody else. A lawful sentence —

16

THE COURT:

17

(Both talking)

18

MR. OLIVER:

19

If you say-

A lawful sentence is not an abuse of

discretion.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. OLIVER:

22

If you believe

Let me finish, Mr. Oliver.
Don't insult my intelligence either

because—

23

THE COURT:

Don't insult mine then.

24

MR. OLIVER:

I'm not.

25

THE COURT:

Mr. Oliver11

1

MR. OLIVER:

2

THE COURT:

I'm speaking my piece.
Well, if you came in here to just want to

3

give me a speech that I'm a bad judge and no other judge in the

4

state of Utah would have done this, I didn't do this because

5

you represented your son.

6

than what I read and basically based upon my discretion and

7

that's what I did it on.

8

have against you, any agenda I have against your son, anything

9

about a search warrant that was signed by me about him.

I didn't do this for anything other

I did not do it on any agenda that I

I

10

don't even recall that.

11

of what I read and I believe that that was the appropriate

12

sentence.

13

bad that no other judge would be able to do this in history,

14

then you might be able to say that that's abuse of discretion

15

if not another person but Judge Kay would have done that.

16

Anything that I did was on the basis

If you believe it is wrong, if you believe it is so

So, I'm happy to hear - you are entitled to your

17

opinion but I also have to say to you most of the things that

18

you have been saying to me right now, you said first of all I

19

want to express my displeasure and my loss of confidence in the

20

bench, I don't want to reargue this and then for the last half

21

hour, you've reargued this.

22

MR. OLIVER:

You've reargued —

No, I'm explaining my loss of confidence

23

and this Court is not going to call my son back in here and re-

24

sentence him.

25 I that.

I know that.

I haven't asked for it and I know

Okay12

1

that I was thought was existent.

2

here to talk about now.

3

history and facts surrounding this case.

4

explained - I've basically gone through everything I had to

5

say.

I've come to talk about a criminal

6

THE COURT: Okay.

7

MR. OLIVER:

8
9

That's not what I've come

That's it.

I've

But the situation is, your comment about

a month didn't come from me, not at all.
THE COURT:

10

MR. OLIVER:

11

THE COURT:

Well And it gives me great concern.
Well, you can believe what you want to

12

believe and probably nothing I say will change your belief.

13

said a month because that had been somehow discussed.

I

I didn't

14 j bring that out of the air and I didn't bring that out of the
15

air saying but really what I've done is taken something else to

16

consider that I didn't raise with counsel—

17

MR. OLIVER:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. OLIVER:

20

THE COURT:

You didn't say that.
Well, I didn't.
You didn't.

That's one of my concerns.

I didn't and I haven't and whatever you

21

want to believe that you think that I've done something else in

22

making my decision, I did not and if you don't believe that,

23

then you can file your motions.

24

either the motion to withdraw the guilty plea or a motion to

25

say that the sentence is an abuse of discretion but otherwise,

If you have to file regarding

20

1

I can tell you one other thing Mr. Oliver, when you talked

2

about AP&P, AP&P because of the budget of the state of Utah

3

never, hardly ever recommends prison.

4

recommend prison and the reason for that is because they're

5

under budget constraints.

6

jail that is full and every time I put a person a year in jail,

7

I get a call the next day from the jail to let three out and so

8

what I've been doing and what I understand other judges are

9

doing is the people who have a year commitment are usually

Very seldom do they

But I can tell you that we have a

10

going to prison now because we have too heavy of a load in the

11

Davis County Jail.

12
13

MR. OLIVER:

That's wrong.

No, no, no, Your Honor,

may I speak please?

14

THE COURT:

Well, I'm just talking about -

15

MR. OLIVER: I understand that.

16

THE COURT: I'm just saying that today -

17

MR. OLIVER: I accept that.

18

THE COURT:

- today, for example, and last week and

19

the weeks before, people who have been getting one year, have

20

been going to prison.

21

MR. OLIVER:

But Your Honor, and I understand that

22

you're saying that, but I'm telling you that's wrong.

23

are people's lives that we're dealing with and the—

24
25 I right.

THE COURT:

Let me tell you something.

These

This is

These are people's lives and we also have a system and
21

1

that system is based on this issue that a judge, given an AP&P

2

report, has to exercise their discretion and make the decision

3

that they think is proper in the appropriate circumstance,

4

which I try to do.

5

know, a thing at a wall and throw a dart and say hum, prison

6

here; probation; jail.

7

determination and that's what I did and I guess what bothers me

8

just a little bit is the fact that you as both the attorney and

9

as the father are coming into here and telling me that you have

I don't come out here and just point, you

No, I read those and I make the best

10

no confidence in the Court and all this other stuff that I

11

don't believe you would do if you had somebody else that was

12

the defendant in this case.

13 i

MR. OLIVER:

In this case I certainly would.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. OLIVER:

In this case I certainly would.

16

THE COURT:

We have a difference of opinion.

17

MR. OLIVER: No, no.

18

THE COURT:

19 J

MR. OLIVER: I said that's right.

20

THE COURT: I believe that Mr. Oliver, the defendant,

Okay.

That's right.

Yes, we do.

21

should go to prison based upon his history and what's in the

22

pre-sentence report and upon the discretion that I exercised.

23

You do not and you believe that that's improper.

24

difference of opinion and I don't do it for anything because of

That is a

25 j my feelings toward you, my feelings toward your son or anybody
22

1

else.

It's the basis of my opinion, what was in the report and

2

the exercise of my discretion and as I did with the other five

3

or six people that I sent to prison today, I don't do that

4

lightly.

I don't do it lightly people going to jail or prison.

5

MR. OLIVER:

6

THE COURT:

You know, you've said this and —
And I will say one other thing.

This job

7

is not the easiest job in the world and the two hardest things

8

when people ask you what are the hardest things to do, the

9

first one is sentencing people.

That's the hardest thing to

10

do.

Secondly, is giving custody of children in a divorce

11

action.

12

judge does and when anybody asks me that question like they did

13

at North Layton Jr. High yesterday in Reality Town that I

14

attended, those are the two questions that they were asking.

15

What is the hardest thing a judge does and that's exactly the

16

answer I give to everybody.

17

it isn't easier when I do my best and then told, you know,

18

that you have no respect for me as a judge because I made the

19

decision I made.

20

but I can tell you one thing, there's not a single sole I've

21

pleased in this courtroom today because any time you sentence

22

them, no one is pleased.

23

in any lawsuit.

Those are the two hardest things that I believe a

I'm sorry.

This isn't an easy thing to do and

I'm sorry that I can't please you

One side or the other is not pleased

24

MR. OLIVER: It's interesting -

25 J

THE COURT:

I simply try to do my best.
23

1

believe with all my heart and not just as a father but as a

2

defense attorney, that the system is intended to do two things,

3

rehabilitate and protect the public and if punishment is there,

4

okay, but that's not - as long as we can rehabilitate and

5

protect the public that's what we're after and the bottom line

6

is that when you get a recommendation for jail and because the

7

jail is full you put people into prison is wrong.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. OLIVER:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. OLIVER:

What I said Because they don't deserve prison.
Let's just clarify somethingThey don't deserve prison if the jail

12

recommendation is there because right now, right now, what you

13

have done in this case alone, is taken away his opportunity to

14

sit on a jury.

15

you've taken that away from him because you sent him to prison.

16

402s are no longer eligible, never were, but he's no longer

17

eligible for 402 treatment because he's gone to prison,

The 402 would have rehabilitated that but

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. OLIVER:

I understand that.
So he's going to remain a convicted

20

felon which the county and the State felt after their

21

evaluation of the case, that if he did well on probation he was

22

worthy of• a lesser treatment.

23

You've taken away from him the opportunity even on a drug

24

related basis to go into ARSAT and instead because AP&P

You've taken that away from him.

25 J recommended a year in jail, you sent him to prison because the
26

1

jail is too full.

2
3

THE COURT:

No, that's no the only reason I recommend

that.

4

MR. OLIVER:

5

THE COURT:

I understand.
I just told you the fact is that AP&P

6

doesn't recommend prison because of their budget constraints

7

and they've been told by the higher ups about that and so I am

8

saying that when I get a recommendation and they're saying one

9

year jail, which in reality should be prison, I am sending

10

people to prison.

11

MR. OLIVER:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. OLIVER:

14

THE COURT:

They actually said six months in jail.
They said six monthsStraight time.
-or one year, yes.

I don't know.

If you

15

have anything else to say, please say it but I don't know - I

16

mean, I'm happy to hear what you wanted to say but I'm not

17

changing my opinion.

18
19

MR. OLIVER:

I'm not asking you to.

You haven't

heard me once say please change your mind.

20

THE COURT:

Well, I'm not going to.

21

MR. OLIVER:

22

THE COURT: Okay.

23

MR. OLIVER:

24

THE COURT:

I haven't asked you to.

That's not why I did this.

I did this-

So where do we go from here then if you

25 J say you have no respect for me?

Do you not want to appear in
27

Addendum E

1

sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing

2

made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting

3

attorney are not binding on the judge.

4

opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge

5

may do, is not binding on the judge." And based upon the law

6

as I understand it, as to a motion to withdraw the guilty plea,

7

the fact that the State agreed that there would be a two step

8

reduction on 402A is not binding and that is made clear in this

9

form that's been approved by the Utah Supreme Court.

10
11

I also know that any

So I'm

going to deny that motion.
So which one do you wish to do next?

We have a

12

petition for post-conviction relief; a motion to correct the

13

sentence; and then a motion to stay the sentence.

14
15

MR. OLIVER:

I think we'll do the motion to correct

the sentence at this time, Your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. OLIVER:

Okay, go ahead.
This is pursuant to Rule 22 in the Utah

18

Rules of Criminal Procedure.

19

court may correct an illegal sentence where a sentence imposed

20

in an illegal manner at any time."

21

Your Honor, at the time of sentencing, the pre-sentence report

22

was prepared and I'd like to just go back through the PSI with

23

regard to the offenses that Mr. Oliver had faced in his history

24

and if the Court has the PSI in front of it, it's on page 6.

25

THE COURT:

This would be 22E.

It says "the

In this particular matter,

I don't have the PSI.

* Ifoft

1

MR. OLIVER:

I don't think I have an extra one but

2

I'd be happy to let the Court review mine as well if the Court

3

so desires.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR.~ OLIVER:

I'm making notes.
Okay.

Go ahead.

Mr. Oliver as a juvenile was

6

convicted of three offenses.

One was a possession of tobacco

7

which is a status offense and an infraction.

8

that Mr. Oliver was convicted of stemmed out of one incident,

9

May 15th, 1994 incident, possession of marijuana and drug

The next thing

10

paraphernalia.

11

are the only things in Mr. Oliver's juvenile history that he

12

was convicted of were those three offenses that I've indicated

13

stemming from two particular occasions.

14

93 and the possession of marijuana and paraphernalia were May

15

15th of *94.

16

Both of them are Class B Misdemeanors.

Those

The tobacco was a 6-1-

There was there other juvenile history.

Some status

17

offenses, none...there were motion hearings, review hearings,

18

things of that nature, some cases that were dismissed, things

19

of that nature that went on.

20

of that nature.

21

There was no felonies or anything

Then as an adult, Mr. Olive has been charged with
On April 4th of ^95 he was charged with

22

five offenses.

23

possession of paraphernalia to which he pled guilty.

24

Class B Misdemeanor.

25

DUI to which he pled guilty.

It was a

On March 2nd of 1996 he was charged with
On July 21, 1996 he was charged

On November 2 6th,

1

with simple assault to which he pled guilty.

2

1998 he pled guilty to disturbing the peace and on February

3

12th, 1999 he pled guilty to disturbing the peace.

4

his total offenses.

5

never were any of them charged as felonies and reduced to

6

misdemeanors.

7

virtually pled guilty straight up to all of them except it

8

looks like the disturbing the peace was an amended charge but

9

that was it.

He has five.

Those are

They were all misdemeanors,

They were misdemeanors at the outset and he

So he's only been charged with misdemeanors in

10

his past, never a felony.

11

formal probation.

12

report.

13

probation parole history, the defendant has never been

14

supervised on formal probation.

15

He has never been on supervised or

That's contained within the pre-sentence

That's on page 7 of the pre-sentence report.

It says

This Court at the time of sentencing indicated, it

16

says, x^You have served some time but generally you've been on

17

probation quite a bit and it doesn't seem like anything has

18

worked."

19

this type of conduct in and out of various charges and very bad

20

behavior for the last 10 years.

21

going to send him to prison to teach him a lesson that he

22

cannot continue this type of behavior.

23

go on to say, "I think the change of the last month or so, has

24

been changed to make it look good basically for this.

25

believe you, you know.

Then it goes on to say that he's been involved in

Then you indicate that you're

It says, and then you

I can't compare 10 years of bad

I don't

1

behavior with one month of good saying everything is fine."

2

But again, I went back through the transcript and in no place

3

did anyone mention a month.

4

June 14th and then released for an incarceration on July 3rd

5

and he had been out from July 3rd to January 16th and that's the

6

time period that I had addressed and he had changed his life

7

around totally and completely during that time period; had been

8

drug free; had had a full time job, was productive; had gotten

9

married; was doing numerous productive things with his life and

Mr. Oliver had been arrested on

10

certainly it was not one month period of time.

11

his life around.

12

He had changed

Also, the co-defendants in this matter and I went

13

through the co-defendants, one of the co-defendants, Breanna

14

SolDaro Oliver, was ordered to serve 35 days in jail and that

15

was suspended.

16

placed on probation to AP&P for the offense of attempted

17

distribution of a controlled substance, a Class A Misdemeanor

18

and it was noted that in the police report in Case #021701498

19

that Braydon Larkin was actually, admitted that he had entered

20

the garage and took the wallet and cash from the victim that

21

Mr. Oliver actually pled guilty to and Braydon Larkin in the

22

PSI on page 4, actually admitted to that particular offense.

23

David Reed, there was no information.

24

and Jeremy Olthron was on probation for child abuse, a third

25

degree felony, and property obtained by unlawful conduct, a

She was a co-defendant.

Braydon Larkin was

I don't know his status

1

Class B Misdemeanor and Mr. Olthron had absconded and is a

2

fugitive from justice.

3

I don't know his status today.

Each one of these co-defendants had received

4

considerably less of a sentence than Mr. Oliver had received,

5

and then when I spoke with the Court later, the Court indicated

6

that one of the reasons that Mr. Oliver had been sentenced to

7

prison was because the jail was full and the jail also does

8

contract housing with regards to the federal system.

9

does contract housing for INS and for the prison itself and as

It also

10

a matter of fact I just recently received a brochure from the

11

prison indicating that Mr. Oliver could actually be housed in

12

Davis County under contract with the County as a state

13

prisoner.

14

to State v. (inaudible).

15

review that case?

16

With all of this in mind, Your Honor, and referring

THE COURT:

Has the Court had the opportunity to

Why don't you tell me how that case

17

applies to this that this was imposed, sentence was imposed in

18

an illegal manner.

19

MR. OLIVER: Okay, I'm going to read directly from

20

(inaudible) a couple of provisions.

In (inaudible) it's

21

quoting Howell, State v. Howell, 707 P Second, 115, it says, "A

22

sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the

23

defendant in light of his background and the crime committed

24

and also serve the interest of society which underlie the

25

criminal justice system."

That's also quoted in State v.
8

1

McClendon which indicates that the sentencing judge has

2

discretion in determining what punishment fits both the crime

3

and the offender and then the court goes onto say, "We have

4

consistently sought to sure up the soundness and reliability of

5

the factual basis upon which the judge must rely in the

6

exercise of that sentencing discretion."

7

Lipski, 608 P Second, 1241, requiring disclosure of pre-

8

sentence report.

9

sound procedures aimed at insuring that a trial court bases its

10

sentencing decision on such information, a criminal defendant's

11

right to be sentenced based on relevant and reliable

12

information regarding his crime, his background, and the

13

interests of society stands independent of the Utah Rule of

14

Criminal Procedure, 22A" and that's, they're referring to the

15

constitution provision, Article I, Section 7, the due process

16

provision.

17

Quoting State v.

Then it says, "Although Rule 22A implements

What happened in (inaudible) was that at the time of

18

sentencing, the defendant failed to appear and his was in front

19

of Judge Frederick in the Third District.

20

to appear.

21

Frederick, based upon he failure to appear, sentenced the

22

defendant to the maximum that he could, one year in the county

23

jail and six months in the county jail.

24

appealed and the Court of Appeals vacated the sentence saying

The defendant failed

It was on a Class A and Class B Misdemeanor.

Judge

The sentence was

25 I the defendant's failure to appear is not a factor, or it's one

1

factor that may be considered but it is not a basis upon which

2

to impose maximum jail time, and then they went on to indicate

3

that - and this is where the phrase comes that it should be

4

based on relevant, reliable information regarding his crime,

5

his background, and the interests of society and that the due

6

process requirement that the sentence be appropriate to the

7

person, the crime, the background of the person, that that's

8

what the Court should consider and the Court is expected to

9

follow the due process procedures, due process and allow the

10

defendant due process and sentence him accordingly.

11

vacated the sentence and sent it back down.

12

So they

In this particular case, our position is that if the

13

jail is full, that that is not a basis to send Mr. Oliver to

14

prison for.

15

months in the county jail, straight time.

16

that whenever you get a one year sentence recommendation, that

17

you automatically send them to prison because the jail is full

18

and that based thereupon, that' s what you were going to do in

19

this case.

20

The recommendation was, from the PSI was for six

THE COURT:

This Court indicated

Well, first of all just so the record is

21

absolutely clear, the only thing that was said at the time of

22

the sentencing was at the beginning.

23

4:21 p.m., you made the statement, "I recognize that once this

24

Court sentences people to prison that the Court loses

When you came back at

25 I jurisdiction for the most part and this is not a motion.'' And
10

1

then after another hour of basically, I don't know what you

2

could call what you did.

3

all I can say is that it reminded me of what happened on the

4

second hearing, or the second time you wanted to make your

5

statement which was not quote, "In the nature of a motion'' or

6

anything else other than to get something off your chest and

7

then you used the basis of a statement made at that point as

8

the basis of the decision.

9

MR. OLIVER:

I've read this transcript today and

That's what the record is.

And that's fine, and I'll be happy to

10

read into the record what the statement was because that was a

11

statement that—

12

THE COURT:

Maybe you can clarify for me, Mr. Oliver,

13

can you tell me then that I as a judge then, if I'm going to

14

put somebody in for a year and whether they serve a year in the

15

prison or if they serve a year in the jail, and one is crowded

16

and one isn't, that at no time can I ever have that as a

17

consideration?

18

illegal?

19

Is that what you're saying that that is

MR. OLIVER:

I'm not sure I understand your question

20

but that's not the sentence.

If you sentence him to a year,

21

that's a year and that year should be in the jail. However, if

22

you're sentencing to prison, it's an indeterminate term for one

23

to 15.

24

people to prison for one year.

That is not one year.

This Court does not sentence
It becomes then the purview of

25 I the Board of Pardons to deal with that.

So sentencing to jail
11

1

for one year is not the same thing as sentencing to prison for

2

one to 15.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. OLIVER:

Okay, anything further as to this motion?
If I may just - I'm sorry I thought I

5

had it marked.

I wasn't going to go that far into the

6

afternoon hearing, but...

7

month issue.

8

particular copy.

9

then we went on and I says, well, (inaudible) said, "Well, I

Okay.

We were talking about the

This is - I don't have a page number on that
We were talking about the month issue and

10

didn't." And I said, "You didn't, that's one of my concerns."

11

The Court says, "I didn't and I haven't and whatever you want

12

to believe that you think that I've done something else in

13

making my decision, I did not and if you don't believe that,

14

then you can file your motions.

15

either the motion to withdraw the guilty plea or a motion to

16

say that the sentence is abuse of discretion, otherwise I can

17

tell you one other thing, Mr. Oliver, when you talk about AP&P,

18

AP&P because of the budget of the State of Utah hardly ever

19

recommends prison, very seldom do they recommend prison and the

20

reason for that is because they're under budget constraints,

21

but I can tell you that we have a jail that is full and every

22

time that I put a person a year in jail, I get a call the next

23

day from the jail to let three out and so what I've been doing

24

and what I understand other judges are doing, is the people who

If you have to file regarding

25 J have a year commitment are usually going to prison now because
12

1

we have too heavy a load in the Davis County Jail."

2

the Court's own statement to me when we were talking about this

3

one month issue and then the Court made that statement to me.

4

That was at the 4:00 o'clock afternoon hearing.

5

That was

But our position is that the sentence was imposed in

6

an illegal manner because due process considerations were not

7

there.

8

Oliver to go to prison.

9

people from the prison and numerous other attorneys and I have

10

found no one that indicates that indeed a jail being full is a

11

basis to send someone to prison, especially someone who has

12

never been on formal probation, never been charged with a

13

felony.

14

The fact that the jail is full is not a factor for Mr.
I've had occasion to discuss this with

This was a non-violent felony.
THE COURT:

Well, just so the record's clear and the

15

statement was made not in a motion, not at the time of

16

sentencing, but just so it's clear, that was never anywhere in

17

the transcript of the entire two hearings that we had until

18

almost 5:30 that was it ever said that that was the basis upon

19

which.

20

wasn't the sole basis.

21

did we have that there were six felonies and five misdemeanors

22

in these cases and then he pled to four felonies, all that took

23

place in a week's period of time from June 6 to June 12, 2002

24

besides his five misdemeanors, besides his juvenile court

You were asking things and I gave you that.

25 I record beforehand?

That

I mean, in anywhere of this discussion

Was that the history?
13

MR. OLIVER:

1
2

I'm sorry, I'm not sure I understand the

question.

3

THE COURT:

In these cases—

4

MR. OLIVER:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. OLIVER:

7

THE COURT:

8

answer the question.

9

charges in the three files, there are as I count them six

The current chargesLet me—
The current chargesDon' t ask a question and then not let me
The question was that in the current

10

felonies and four or five misdemeanors that took place in a

11

period of June 6th through June 12th of 2002, is that accurate

12

or not?

13

MR. OLIVER:

14

THE COURT:

That's what he was charged with.
And then he pled guilty to four felonies,

15

three third degree felonies and a second degree felony; is that

16

correct?

17

MR. OLIVER:

18

THE COURT:

That's correct.
And so that's what he pled to and you

19

talked about the five adult misdemeanors.

20

juvenile court record?

21

MR. OLIVER:

22

THE COURT: Okay, and that-

23

MR. OLIVER:

24

THE COURT:

25

Then he had also a

Uh-huh (affirmative).

An infraction and two misdemeanors.
Okay.

All right, anything further on

this matter, on this motion?
14

1

MR. OLIVER:

No, not at this time.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. PETERSON:

What is the position of the State?
The position of the State is pretty

4

simple and straight forward that the Court did not abuse its

5

discretion in issuing the sentence, that the sentence that was

6

issued is the statutory guidelines for second and third degree

7

felonies, that at the time the plea was taken, the Court

8

advised Mr. Oliver, the defendant Mr. Oliver, that potential

9

penalties for these guilty pleas are as follows: one to 15 and

10

zero to five on the third degrees and the Court followed that

11

and the Court hasn't gone beyond anything and did not abuse its

12

discretion in issuing this sentence.

13

THE COURT:

What is your understanding, Mr. Peterson,

14

as to what it means when it says an illegal manner under that

15

rule?

16

an illegal manner?

What type of things are - what is the sentence when it's

17
18
19

MR. PETERSON:

When a sentence is in an illegal

manner?
THE COURT:

Yes.

Is that something like where if

20

it's a third degree felony and you give them five to life

21

instead of zero to five?

22

MR. PETERSON:

That is how I would interpret it or if

23

someone pled guilty to a Class A Misdemeanor and they were

24

sentenced to the prison instead of jail or a fine level is

25 I $10,000 instead of $5,000 where it should be.

An illegal
15

1

sentence in my mind is one that goes beyond the statutory

2

provisions for each count.

3

THE COURT:

Okay, do you have anything further?

4

MR. PETERSON:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. OLIVER:

I do not.

Okay.

Is there any reply?

Yes, as a matter of fact, the fact of

7

Lanosec which is 428 Utah Advanced Report 10 and it's a 2001

8

Utah Appeals, so it's a 2001 case is contained within the

9

annotations of the section talking about sentence imposed in an

10

illegal manner.

11

through and read the notations.

12

contemplated that it's a sentence that exceeds the statutory

13

requirements but also one that exceeds due process requirements

14

and the Court of Appeals has treated it that way and they

15

decided it in the court's therewith and so the circumstances

16

are that the court felt that imposing a maximum sentence

17

because of his failure to appear was imposed in an illegal

18

manner and it was an illegal sentence.

19

vacated the sentence and reversed it and that's where we are.

20

That's where I found Lanosec is when I went

MR. PETERSON:

So obviously it's not just

They reversed it, they

And if I may, Your Honor, I think Mr.

21

Oliver is accurate that the judge in that gave the maximum

22

because the defendant didn't appear.

23

the facts.

24

thorough PSI or pre-sentence report was conducted and the

That is to differentiate

That is not what occurred here in this case.

A

25 I defendant was present, the defendant was aware of the potential
16

1

penalties, the court in making its sentence actually reviewed

2

the record, advised at the time of the sentence that because of

3

the defendant's background this is the consideration the Court

4

was taking.

5

prison as part of your statement that it's usual that they may

6

go to prison, if the sentence is for one year or more at the

7

jail, that all of those factor in an due process was given to

8

Mr. Oliver in this case, when in the Lanosec matter was simply

9

a matter of you failed to appear, you are getting the maximum

Even if we count part of the consideration of the

10

which didn't take into account any of his prior history, any of

11

his prior background.

12

case.

13

judge and ended up with the maximum anyway after the judge

14

considered all of the factors in the case.

We don't know the final ending of that

Mr. Manosa could easily have gone back to the sentencing

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. OLIVER:

Anything further?
Just briefly.

With regards to this,

17

what Mr. Lanosec ended up in the long run has no relevancy to

18

this case whatsoever not does it change the outcome of the

19

case.

20

through and you should evaluate the individual, you should look

21

and see about his rehabilitative ability, the ability to be

22

supervised, all of these things you need to take a look at and

23

then base there upon, enter a sentence that is appropriate to

24

the defendant.

The outcome of the Lanosec case was that you should go

That's the theory behind the Lanosec.

It's not

25 I just a matter of whether he appeared or whether he didn't
17

1

appear.

2

Appeals states, "Although Rule 22A implements sound procedures

3

aimed at insuring that the trial court bases its sentencing

4

decision on such information, a criminal defendant's right to

5

be sentenced based on relevant and reliable information

6

regarding his crime, his background and the interest of society

7

stands independent of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.7'

8

So it goes further and it says that "indeed that the discretion

9

is not absolute."

10

They're saying, as a matter of fact the Court of

I recently read in the newspaper about a case wherein

11

an individual was given 800 hours of community service as a

12

result of two armed robberies wherein a gun was used and I find

13

that this particular situation with Mr. Oliver is far less

14

egregious than armed robbery on two different occasions with a

15

shotgun.

16

background or history, don't know what the recommendations

17

were.

18

months with work release.

19

60 to 90 days with work release.

20

who have dealt with the case all along, AP&P, the county

21

attorney, they made the recommendations and there is no

22

compelling reason in this case to depart from the

23

recommendations that were received.

24

aggravating circumstances.

Now, I don't know the other person's personal

Here the recommendation was six months straight time, 12
The County at that time recommended
So after those professionals

There's not extreme

And I also went through at the time

25 J of sentencing and went through and talked about some of the
18

1

mitigating circumstances.

For example, it says "offender

2

presents a serious threat of violent behavior" that's not true.

3

That's marked inaccurately in this circumstances.

4

true.

5

arrest" that is not true.

6

had happened was the charges came down after his arrest.

7

was picked up and incarcerated.

8

Then in the mitigating, the AP&P put in there "Offender's

9

attitude suggests amenability to supervision" they included

That is not

"Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to

He

There was no further conduct.

10

that.

11

employment and/or family relationships.

12

would entail excessive hardship on offender or dependents."

13

Those were checked off by AP&P as mitigating circumstances.

14

then believe that there was two others, restitution would be

15

severely compromised by incarceration and that the offender had

16

extended period of arrest free street time which stemmed back

17

to his last incident in Colorado in 1999. So—

18

That was #7.

We pointed that out that indeed what

#8, "Offender has exceptionally good

THE COURT:

#9, "Imprisonment

So let me ask a question.

I

Are you saying

19

then that if the people at Adult Probation and Parole do a

20

recommendation and the county attorney concurs or does a

21

recommendation and the defendant concurs and does a

22

recommendation and the judge doesn't follow the recommendations

23

of those people, that that becomes an illegal sentence or an

24

abuse of discretion?

25 I

MR. OLIVER:

I don't think I've said that.
19

1

THE COURT:

Okay, then tell me then, there have been

2

many times when they have asked for jail and I have not given

3

jail.

4

I have given it or they've asked for jail and I've given

5

prison.

6

four more of the people go to prison and sometimes I follow the

7

recommendations and sometimes I do not but it's been my

8

understanding that what a judge is suppose to do is he's

9

suppose to take into consideration all the facts and give the

There has been times when they haven't asked for it and

If you were here today you would have seen three or

10

best sentence that they can do based upon all the circumstances

11

and that's what I did and so if it's illegal, if all we're

12

going to do from now on, part of your argument both here and in

13

the afternoon of the last hearing, and here today is that

14

you're not following what AP&P says, you're not following what

15

the county attorney says, we don't need judges for sentencing,

16

we can just have AP&P be the sentence.

17

perfunctory because what we would have to do is give all of the

18

ability to sentence people to Adult Probation and Parole and

19

until and unless that is the system, I do not know what to do

20

otherwise than to do the best I can with the information that's

21

been given.

22

MR. OLIVER:

Judges would be

You know, I went through prior to,

23

(inaudible) time over to the county attorney and actually

24

comment that you requested input on and—

25 J

THE COURT:

Requested what?
20

1

MR. OLIVER:

That you requested input on from the

2

attorney here today.

3

do anything other than just address a regular sentencing and

4

why I thought he should not be in prison.

5

I went through and I never once tried to

Now, you've brought it down to where I think that we

6

should go with judges and just let AP&P and county attorney

7

determine.

8

there.

9

I haven't said that.

THE COURT:

Okay.

I've not even tried to go

How many times have you said

10

today, Mr. Oliver, and how many times have you said in this

11

transcript going over what AP&P recommended, what AP&P

12

recommended and what AP&P recommended and then just before I

13

made my comment you were talking about that AP&P have

14

recommended this, the county attorney had recommended this and

15

then you don't follow it?

16

asked the question, if a judge departs from what AP&P does,

17

then is that either an illegal sentence or an abuse of

18

discretion?

19

it in this circumstance and not when I do it in another case

20

when I don't follow their direction?

21

So what is your argument?

And I

I just want to know what your position is. Why is

MR. OLIVER:

There's never been supervised probation

22

for Mr. Oliver.

There has never been a felony charge

23

previously with Mr. Oliver.

24

work to get there.

Normally to end up at prison, you

You go through the system several times and

25 J you're placed on probation.

You succeed, you fail or whatever
21

1

the case may be but you get a chance to show that once they

2

slap you up side the head and have your attention, are you

3

going to straighten up your life and fly straight and then not

4

go back there again?

5

brought back again, the court then looks at it a little bit

6

different and gives maybe a harsher sentence but still - and it

7

depends upon the crime and it depends on the person, it depends

8

on a lot of things but the circumstances are you don't start

9

off a first felony, non-violent, as I indicated previously,

If you choose not to do that, you're

10

this is not a particularly aggravated crime.

11

can throw the numbers out and Mr. Oliver did not deny the

12

numbers but we can throw the numbers out there but the

13

circumstances are that Mr. Oliver has not been through the

14

system and been given that one chance, not even one chance to

15

sit back and say, "Okay, you're on probation, let's watch you,

16

let's see how you're going to conduct your life.

17

real serious stuff here.

18

deserve the break or that you do deserve the break."

19

I'm not going to give you the break.

20

I recognize we

You're facing

Now go prove to us that you don't
This says

So, you know, when the system and due process is of

21

such a nature that says you should consider the individual, the

22

nature of the crime and the needs of society, then sentences

23

should be commensurate one with another with other people.

24

should not be disparate and in this particular case, that's

25 I exactly where we are.

This is a desperate sentence.

It

This is
22

1

his first felony charge.

He's never been on probation before

2

and he starts off in prison.

3

first resort.

Prison is a last resort on a

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. OLIVER:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. PETERSON:

8

THE COURT: Okay, as it relates to the second motion

9

Anything further?
Nope.
Anything further from the State?
Submit it.

which is petition for post-conviction relief and motion to

10

correct the sentence imposed in an illegal manner, I'm denying

11

that motion for the following grounds.

12

believe that this sentencing violated due process; that under

13

the case law or statutes that it was illegal; that I took into

14

consideration the fact that he had had a juvenile record, that

15

he had had five misdemeanors that had gone as an adult from

16

1995 to 1999; that he'd been charged in a spree of felonies

17

between June 6th and June 12th in these three cases; that he

18

ultimately pled to four felonies that included burglaries and

19

restitution.

20

sentenced him to prison.

21

I believe that is not illegal and if it is illegal, then you

22

have your appeal and the Appellate Court can make that

23

decision.

24
25

First of all, I do not

Taking all those things into consideration, I
I believe that is within due process.

Okay, let's go to our third motion.

It's the motion

to stay sentence pending defendant's post-judgment motions and

23
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
JACKSON, Presiding Judge.
*1 Thomas Headley appeals the district court's denial
of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence submitted
under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. He contends the district court erred in
ruling that his motion did "not attack the legality of
the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the
sentence was imposed." Headley's contention is twofold: (1) his counsel at sentencing provided
ineffective assistance; and (2) the sentencing court
relied on information in the presentence report that
the court knew was false. We affirm.
A district court's Rule 22(e) decision is a legal
question that we review for correctness, see State v
Brooks, 908 P2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995); State v
Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 384-85 (Utah Ct App.1997),
and we can affirm the decision "if it is sustainable on
any legal ground or theory apparent on the record."
State v Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 31, 994 P 2d 1243.
Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides for resentencing when a sentence is illegal
or "imposed in an illegal manner." Utah R Crim. P.
22(e). The definition of an "illegal sentence" has been
construed narrowly to include only sentences "where
the sentence does not conform to the crime of which
the defendant has been convicted." [FN1] State v

Parker, 872 P2d 1041, 1043 n. 2 (Utah
Ct.App.1994). Utah law has no comprehensive
definition of sentences "imposed in an illegal
manner"; however, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled
that a sentence is imposed in an illegal manner when
a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth
Amendment right to counsel during sentencing.
[FN2] See Kuehnert v Turner, 28 Utah 2d 150, 499
P.2d 839, 841 (1975) (concluding that the sentence
was illegal because the defendant did not have
counsel at sentencing, was not informed of his Sixth
Amendment rights during sentencing, and had not
knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth
Amendment rights). [FN3] In Kuehnert, the Utah
Supreme Court stated that the presence of counsel at
sentencing is necessary
FN1. Nonconforming sentences include
those where the sentence exceeds the
statutory limits See, eg, State v
Higginbotham, 917 P2d 545, 551 (Utah
1996) (concluding that the sentence was
illegal because statute only authorized one
year enhancement and the court enhanced
sentence by two years), State v Patience,
944 P2d 381, 388 (Utah Ct App 1997)
(noting that the sentence was illegal because
it exceeded statutory term) Nonconforming
sentences also occur when the court is
without jurisdiction to impose a sentence
See, eg, State v Hurst, 111 P2d 1029,
1036 n. 6 (Utah 1989) (stating that
sentences can be attacked when beyond the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court) State v
Arviso, 1999 UT App 381,ffi|5-8, 993 P 2d
894 (stating that the sentence was illegal
because Supremacy Clause deprived
sentencing court of jurisdiction), State v
Grate, 947 P 2d 1161, 1168 (Utah
Ct App 1997) (stating that the sentence was
illegal because court did not have
jurisdiction to revoke probation)
FN2. Other jurisdictions have defined
sentences imposed m an illegal manner as
those that are within statutory and
jurisdictional limits, but violate a
defendant's rights, see, e g, Government of
the VI v Martinez, 239 F 3d 293, 299 n 3
(3rd Cir 2001), State v McNeills, 546 A 2d
292, 305-06 (Conn Ct App 1988) State v
Sieler, 554 N W 2d 447, 479 (S D 1996) cf
State v Anderson, 661 P 2d 716, 720-24
(Haw Ct App 1983) State v Brooks, 589
A 2d 444, 447 (Maine 1991), or that are
based on erroneous information See, e g,
United States v Katzin, 824 F 2d 234, 238
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(3rd Cir. 1987).
FN3. Kuehnert, which discusses illegal
sentences under the rules in force prior to
Rule 22(e), was not cited in the parties'
briefs.
so that there is a real opportunity to present to the
court facts in extenuation of the offense or in
explanation of the defendant's conduct, as well as
to correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the
defendant's past record and to appeal to the equity
of the court in its administration and enforcement
of penal laws.
M a t 840-41. [FN4]
FN4. See also McConnellv. Rhay, 393 U.S.
2, 4, 89 S.Ct. 32, 33- 34 (1968) ("As we
said in Mempa [v Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,135,
88 S.Ct 254, 257 (1967) ], 'the necessity for
the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts,
introducing evidence of mitigating
circumstances[,] and in general aiding and
assisting the defendant to present his case as
to sentence is apparent.' Therightto counsel
at sentencing must, therefore, be treated like
the right to counsel at other stages of
adjudication." (Citation omitted.)).
Headley first claims his counsel at sentencing
provided ineffective assistance, thus depriving him of
his Sixth Amendment right. To support his claim,
Headley makes six assertions, four are as follows: (1)
he asserts that his challenge to misinformation in the
presentence investigation report was rejected by the
sentencing court because it was poorly handled by
sentencing counsel; (2) he challenges several factual
statements contained in the presentence investigation
report; (3) he asserts that "his own counsel accused
him of being involved in incest when that information
was not otherwise before the court"; and (4) he
asserts that "his [sentencing] counsel convinced a
witness with potentially exculpatory evidence not to
cooperate with [Headley]." Each of these four
assertions has some connection with the presentence
investigation report, which is not in the record on
appeal. Further, no other information in the record
supports these assertions. Accordingly, as discussed
below, we are unable to address them.
*2 Next, Headley claims the sentencing court
imposed a $10,000 fine without reason and without
objection by his counsel. We find no mention of a
$10,000 fine in the record. The only fines mentioned
in the sentencing context, a $1,000 recoupment fee

and an unspecified amount to "pay for costs of
extradition and for therapy of victim," are found in
the sentencing transcript and the Judgment filed three
days later. Finally, Headley alleges that "his counsel
intentionally tried to prevent him from pursuing an
appeal." However, the record reflects that Headley
filed a notice of appeal on September 24, 1992, but
voluntarily moved to dismiss his appeal to "file a
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty." Headley's
motion was granted on October 8, 1992, and the
record contains no indication of subsequent attempts
to appeal the case.
Without the presentence report or other information
which may or may not be in the sentencing court
record, the record submitted to us is inadequate for
our review of Headley's ineffective assistance claim.
All we have are Headley's unilateral, bald assertions
of misconduct. As we have stated,
When a defendant predicates error to [an
appellate court], he has the duty and
responsibility of supporting such allegation by an
adequate record. Absent that record, a defendant's
assignment of error stands as a unilateral
allegation which the reviewing court has no
power to determine. [An appellate court] simply
cannot rule on a question which depends for its
existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the
record. Consequently, in the face of an
[in] adequate record on appeal, [we] must assume
the regularity of the proceedings below.
State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (1998)
(internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations
in original); see also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,
t 17, 12 P.3d 92 ("Where the record appears
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies
resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor
of a finding that counsel performed effectively.").
Accordingly, we reject Headley's Sixth Amendment
claim.
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court was
biased because it relied on information in the
presentence report that the court knew was false. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (Supp.2001) gives a
sentencing judge discretion in evaluating information
in a presentence report and requires the judge to
"make a determination of relevance and accuracy on
the record." Here, the sentencing judge made a
determination of the relevance and accuracy of the
presentence report, deciding the presentence report
was "comprehensive in all the details," and stating
that those working on elements of the presentence
report "do a pretty good job." The sentencing court
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has broad discretion to resolve factual disputes for or
against a defendant, see id, and we cannot say the
court exceeded its discretion in making this
determination. Further, without the presentence
report, the record is inadequate and " '[we] must
assume the regularity of the proceedings below.' "
Penman, 964 P.2d at 1162 (citation omitted)
(alteration in original).
*3 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial
of Headley's Rule 22(e) motion for resentencing.
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., J, concur.
GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in the result).
I concur in the result reached by my colleagues, but
would affirm on what I perceive to be a more
straightforward basis. As stated by the majority, the
trial court denied defendant's Rule 22(e) motion
because the motion did "not attack the legality of the

sentence imposed nor the manner in which the
sentence was imposed." The trial court was correct.
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel and erroneous factfindingsby the sentencing
judge are simply not cognizable under Rule 22(e).
Defendant has not cited any caselaw holding
otherwise and has also not offered any reasoned
analysis for why Rule 22(e) should apply to his case.
See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)
(briefs must include "reasoned analysis based on
[cited] authority"). The sentence imposed was
permissible under applicable statutes, and the trial
court properly resolved factual disputes presented to
it. Defendant raises no claims legitimately related to
whether the sentence was illegal or "imposed in an
illegal manner." Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e). On that basis,
I would affirm.
2002 WL 287890 (Utah App.), 2002 UT App 58
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